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ABSTRACT: Contribution warfare removed the influence of
Sweden’s politics from the Afghanistan War (2001–14) and created
learning conditions favoring case-specific, tactical lessons over the
strategic ones. This article applies the concept of “contribution
warfare” to analyze the lessons from Sweden’s involvement in
the war. The inconsistent application of this knowledge resulted
largely from the political and operational realities of a small nation
contributing to an alliance dominated by a single actor.

W

hile Sweden was participating in the Afghanistan War
(2001–14), the country’s elite strategists who advise the
government on whether to commit troops and resources
to combat and who direct the execution of military tasks identified
and learned many lessons. Unfortunately the parliament, which decides
whether to use force internationally, and the government, which proposes
the use of force and controls the armed forces, has not applied the
information consistently.
During the mission in Afghanistan, Sweden’s armed forces quickly
institutionalized a new section in their headquarters to identify and
disseminate lessons learned. This effort identified the lack of a clear
political aim for participation in the war in Afghanistan as a shortcoming.
But Sweden’s participation in the United Nations (UN) intervention
in Mali, which similarly lacked a clear political aim that could provide
strategic guidance for the use of force, provides a telling example
of a lesson Sweden identified but did not quite learn. Tactical-level
involvement, however, continuously yields reasons to improve and
case-specific lessons Sweden’s strategists can share throughout the
armed forces.
Contemporary research often intertwines innovation and learning
and roundly criticizes military organizations for failures in both areas.1
Explanations of innovation failure in the military vary from bureaucratic
inertia, a mismatch of conceptions of military virtue, and the particular
nature of innovations. Explanations of learning failure include a lack of

1. Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff, eds., The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001); Richard Lock-Pullan, US Intervention Policy and Army Innovation:
From Vietnam to Iraq (London: Routledge, 2006); Adam Grissom, “The Future of Military Innovation
Studies,” Journal of Strategic Studies 29, no. 5 (2006): 905–34; and Williamson Murray, Military Adaptation
in War: With Fear of Change (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
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processes within the structure of the armed forces that support learning.2
Explanations of the relationship between organizational culture and
outcomes in learning processes are also likely true.3
Although culture explains inertia well, in the short term, it is
a constant that does not explain inconsistency, especially in learning
processes. Moreover, attributing the inconsistency between tactical and
strategic lessons from the Afghanistan War to the culture of the Swedish
armed forces does not explain the government’s decisions. Hence, this
article considers the actions of Sweden’s strategic elites.
These strategists experienced inconsistencies in the organizational
learning of the Swedish armed forces that can be explained by the
inherent difficulties smaller partners encounter when making their
voices heard in coalitions dominated by a single actor. In this structure,
smaller partners cede the establishment of the coalition’s political aims
to the dominant partner. When that occurs, smaller partners make
participation their main task in the coalition’s war, thus conflating the
ends, means, and ways of strategy. In such instances of “contribution
warfare,” smaller coalition members do not allow political direction to
influence their roles in war.4
In this context, the proposition that wars are directed from the
strategic perspective becomes flawed and strategic lessons can be
neglected. If participation is the only aim, then no strategic lessons that
can be applied to conventional wars of self defense can be learned.
Thus, the contribution of this article to the literature is twofold. First,
it provides an empirical analysis of the lessons-learned processes of the
Swedish armed forces beyond the typical examination of international
interventions prior to the Afghanistan War. The most common situation,
arguably, is the Congo crisis in the early 1960s.5 Second, rather than
focusing on organizational culture—and, as many studies do, on tactical
lessons learned—this article focuses on strategic lessons.

Organizational Learning and Coalition Warfare

The traditional, rationalist model of organizational learning
presumes military organizations, through experiential feedback loops,
can identify shortcomings, acquire support for proposed solutions, and
provide solutions in documents such as doctrine or standard operating

2. Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1991); Andrew Hill, “Military Innovation and Military Culture,” Parameters
45, no. 1 (2015): 85–98; John A. Nagl, Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to
Eat Soup with a Knife (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002); Robert T. Foley, “Dumb Donkeys or Cunning
Foxes? Learning in the British and German Armies during the Great War,” International Affairs 90, no.
2 (March 2014): 279–98; and Benjamin M. Jensen, Forging the Sword: Doctrinal Change in the US Army
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2016).
3. Nagl, Counterinsurgency Lessons.
4. J. H. Vance, “Tactics without Strategy or Why the Canadian Forces Do Not Campaign,”
in The Operational Art: Canadian Perspectives, Context and Concepts, ed. Allan English et al. (Kingston:
Canadian Defense Academy Press, 2005), 280–81.
5. Lars Ericson Wolke, Lessons Learned? Svenska operativa och taktiska erfarenheter från Kongokrisen,
1960–1964, Krigsvetenskapliga forskningsrapporter nr. 15 (Stockholm: Försvarshögskolan, 2007).
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procedures.6 This idealized version of organizational learning indicates
Sweden’s learning process was compromised by inexperience with
coalition warfare, including misunderstanding how Sweden would fit
into modern coalition warfare.
The reality of contribution warfare effectively removed the influence
of Sweden’s politics from the war, short-circuited its strategy, and created
learning conditions that favored case-specific, tactical lessons over the
strategic ones. This reality is important to understanding Sweden’s
application of lessons learned from the campaigns in Afghanistan.
Following the traditional model of learning, it is possible to
differentiate between two critical phases in organizational learning.
First, the actor needs to recognize there is something to be learned, that
is, there must be a process to identify lessons. Admittedly, strategists
occasionally have incentives to be secretive regarding what they learn,
therefore, this article may eschew some lessons. But there are also
incentives to demonstrate that strategists lead a learning organization,
which is, after all, an ideal in much of the current discourse.7
Second, the actor needs to act upon such identification to assess
appropriately the lesson as learned. Hence, learning involves the use of
“new knowledge or understanding gained from experience or study to
adjust institutional norms, doctrine and procedures in ways designed to
minimize previous gaps in performance.”8 Evidence of such learning
can be identified by changes to military doctrine, force composition or
force behavior, strategic goals, or decision-making processes.
In the processes of identification and learning, there are numerous
pitfalls. When identifying something as a lesson, an actor may make
flawed inferences about what should be learned from a militarized crisis
or a war. As Elizabeth Kier demonstrated, Germany, France, and Britain
drew completely different conclusions from the First World War, and
arguably, the Germans got it right on the tactical level.9
There is also a risk that the actor will fail to identify any lessons at
all. The British, for example, failed to identify the dangers of infantry
line tactics and cavalry attacks from the American Civil War (1861–65),
which resulted in tremendous loss of life during the early phases of
the First World War. Moreover, bureaucratic inertia or misperceptions
may result in lessons learned too slowly, even if they are rapidly
identified—for example, British intelligence did not update its estimate
of the Japanese preference for surprise attacks after Pearl Harbor, and
thus failed to prepare the defenses of Singapore, which surrendered to
Japanese assault a few months after Pearl Harbor.

6. Nagl, Counterinsurgency Lessons, 6.
7. Hans Hasselbladh and Karl Ydén, “Why Military Organizations Are Cautious about
Learning?,” Armed Forces & Society (March 17, 2019).
8. Richard Downie, quoted in Nagl, Counterinsurgency Lessons, 6 (emphasis added).
9. Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine between the Wars (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997).
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An Asymmetrical Learning Environment

Peculiar circumstances created when small actors participate within
asymmetrical coalitions dominated by a considerably more powerful
military actor might also create inconsistencies between learning and
applying lessons learned from warfare. A common assumption in most
research on coalition warfare involves bargaining within the coalition.
Although this bargaining does not occur on equal terms, all actors are
at least equally interested in discussing the same things.10
This bargaining process, in turn, should lead to a situation in which
resources are used more efficiently and according to the participating
states’ caveats.11 But this ideal image of coalition warfare seemingly
ignores the reality that actors within coalitions have different resources
and different interests at stake. Consequently, small actors within
asymmetrical coalitions realize the huge imbalance between their
resources and the political aims of the war. Thus, they effectively cede
space for political aims to more powerful actors in the coalition. Rather
than employing force for political purposes, as the concept of strategy
implies, they become force providers.12
As the process of ceding political aims to the powerful members
of the coalition occurs, small coalition partners neglect the politics of
war. The task becomes one of providing, not directing, force. In the
absence of political aims, participation becomes both means and ends,
thus short-circuiting the ends, means, and ways of strategy. For small
partner nations, coalition wars effectively become contributory, rather
than wars fought with unity of effort and with clear, jointly agreed
upon, political goals. Notably, this scenario held true for member and
nonmember states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
alike during the Afghanistan War.13
This dynamic does not mean instrumentality is completely lost
for the small coalition partners. It is, however, severely restricted and
compromised. In fact, contribution warfare entails, and is reinforced by,
the idea small coalition partners seek to acquire a reputation as a good
ally to gain advantages from the dominating coalition partner in other
areas.14 This concept suggests small partners contribute for political
10. Eliot A. Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime (New York:
Free Press, 2002); and Kelly Grieco, “Fighting and Learning in the Great War: Four Lessons in
Coalition Warfare,” Parameters 48, no. 3 (2018): 27–36.
11. Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997); and Stephen
M. Saideman and David P. Auerswald, “Comparing Caveats: Understanding the Sources of National
Restrictions upon NATO’s Mission in Afghanistan,” International Studies Quarterly 56, no. 1 (2012):
67–84.
12. Vance, “Tactics without Strategy,” 271–92.
13. Benjamin Schreer, “The Evolution of NATO’s Strategy in Afghanistan,” in Pursuing Strategy:
NATO Operations from the Gulf War to Gaddafi, ed. Håkan Edström and Dennis Gyllensporre (New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 139–56.
14. Peter Viggo Jakobsen, Jens Ringsmose, and Håkon Lunde Saxi, “Prestige-Seeking Small
States: Danish and Norwegian Military Contributions to US-led Operations,” European Journal
of International Security 3, no. 2 (June 2018): 256–77; and Ida Maria Oma and Magnus Petersson,
“Exploring the Role of Dependence in Influencing Small States’ Alliance Contributions: A
Reputation Mechanism Argument and Assessment,” European Security 28, no. 1 (2019): 105–26.
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purposes, and thus use force strategically. But most notably, the political
purpose of appearing to be a good ally does not in any way direct the
means or the ways of strategy. Hence, you can be a good ally regardless
of what you contribute and regardless of how you operate: force is not
directed by a political aim.
In the case of the conflict in Afghanistan, politics did not guide and
direct the use of force. As a result, strategic elites of smaller coalition
actors failed to learn strategic lessons from that conflict. Even if smaller
coalition partners still have strategic choices to make, relinquishing the
political aim of the war means operations lack strategic direction. The
great variation of military behavior in Afghanistan or Denmark, the
Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden proves this point.15 War, and the
continuous learning and adaptation in war, becomes a military rather
than political matter. Following the logic of smaller powers in asymmetric
coalitions, we can now formulate some empirical expectations.
Above all else, if politics does not guide the use of force, we must
expect only comfortable, fitting lessons drawn in ways that conform
to a clear distinction between the learned tactical lessons and the
unlearned strategic lessons. We can also expect the lessons learned will
be case-specific, compartmentalized lessons, because only in cases of
asymmetric coalitions and the resulting contribution warfare, do smaller
coalition partners lack the political aims that influence the use of force.
Although other tasks for the armed forces of smaller coalition
partners may very well be directed with clear political aims, the stakes
associated with the lowly ambition of participating in a coalition make
recognizing strategic lessons from that participation less important;
doing so would suggest the war in question was important. Furthermore,
we can expect meta-learning, that is institutionalized improvements in
learning processes, only in such cases where the mandate or discretion
of the new command or headquarters were limited to case-specific,
tactical lessons.

Lessons Identified and Learned

The Swedish intervention in the Afghanistan War started in January
2002 with a small special forces unit in Kabul. The early entry into the
war can be understood as a lesson learned from the Kosovo conflict
when Sweden was late deciding to join the Kosovo Force. The delay
in joining the NATO peace enforcement mission was a source of
embarrassment for the government. Thus, Sweden was determined to
avoid a similar delay after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on
the United States.16

15. Jan Ångström and Jan Willem Honig, “Regaining Strategy: Small Powers, Strategic Culture,
and Escalation in Afghanistan,” Journal of Strategic Studies 35, no. 5 (2012): 663–87.
16. Lars Wikman, “Don’t Mention the War: Forging a Foreign Policy Consensus: The Case of
Swedish Military Contributions to Afghanistan” (PhD diss., Department of Government, Uppsala
University, forthcoming); and Wilhelm Agrell, Ett krig här och nu (Stockholm: Atlantis, 2013).

66

Parameters 50(4) Winter 2020–21

In 2006 when Sweden took control of the provincial reconstruction
team in Mazār-e Sharīf in northern Afghanistan, the force consisted of
lightly equipped infantry. But there were sizeable reinforcements, and
just over 500 soldiers were present at any given time. But among the
teams in northern Afghanistan, the Swedish armed forces unit eventually
stood out due to its high percentage of combat-ready troops. The
increased mechanization occurred as a tactical adaptation to a gradually
deteriorating security situation and increasing insurgent activity in the
Swedish area of responsibility around 2008–9. This approach resulted
from a lesson learned in Tuzla, Bosnia and Herzegovina, in 1994 when a
company of Danish main battle tanks joined a Swedish battalion. “Walk
softly but carry a big stick” was one of the lessons the Swedish armed
forces learned from the wars in the former Yugoslavia.17
On the tactical level, the Swedish armed forces quickly identified
risks to units and were equally proficient at finding institutional solutions
to the challenges. Consistent with theoretical expectations, these learned
lessons have not been applied in the context of conventional wars of
self-defense. The lessons have been applied, however, in the context
of international missions. Moreover, some tactical lessons learned have
been identified as applicable only to operations in Afghanistan.
First, when improvised explosive devices (IEDs) became a serious
threat for units in northern Afghanistan, the Swedish armed forces
were quick to recognize the dangers and began developing counterIED practices. In 2009 the armed forces issued a new manual on
countering IEDs and increased the protection level of the battalion
vehicles. Notably, the manual explicitly refers to Afghanistan or other
potential international missions, recognizing the tactics are not valid in
the context of defending Sweden against foreign threats.
One report from the Swedish Defense Research Agency observes
the time between detecting a particular threat and implementing new
tactics and delivering new threat-mitigation equipment was as short
as 12 months during the most intense and violent phase of the war.18
Considering the rotation schedule required selecting and training soldiers
more than a year prior to deployment, the 12-month development of a
new capability is impressive.
Second, the armed forces introduced military observation team
(MOT) Juliette, an all-female group of soldiers and officers created for
intelligence purposes. This initiative arose from intelligence gathering
being recognized as a critical activity in the Afghanistan War. When
Colonel Bengt Sandstrom returned to Sweden from the conflict, he
began to experiment with different solutions. After being selected to
become the commander of the entire Swedish contingent, he built a
consensus within the armed forces to improve intelligence by targeting
Afghan women. Access to this population was easier for female than
17. Ulf Henricsson, När Balkan brann! (Stockholm: Svenskt Militärhistoriskt Bibliotek, 2013).
18. Henric Roosberg and Anna Weibull, Försvarsmakten efter ISAF: Lärdomar och påverkan på
militärstrategisk nivå, FOI-R--3914--SE (Stockholm: Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut, 2014), 60.
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male soldiers and MOT Juliette was launched in 2008, four years after
its inception.19
A crucial aspect for the argument advanced here is the lessons
regarding quick applications of forces and innovation were not applied
to defending Sweden. Consistent with contribution warfare, what
happened in Afghanistan stayed in Afghanistan. At home, the major
reorganization of the armed forces in 2009–10 followed different logic
that was further accentuated by the Russian interventions in Georgia
and Ukraine.20
Rather than incorporating the effective counterinsurgency lessons
from Afghanistan, the dominating tactical doctrine for Sweden’s defense
was based upon maneuver warfare with mechanized units. Case-specific
lessons were stovepiped, ensuring neither all-female squads, nor counterIED lessons were included in exercises or planning for national defense.
Since the introduction of gender in the armed forces was couched
in terms of intelligence purposes and efficiency in peace support
operations, applicability to the defense of Sweden appeared irrelevant,
despite a recent surge in inequality arguments within the armed forces.21
Third, at a more general, procedural level, when the security
situation deteriorated in Afghanistan, the armed forces were relatively
quick to institutionalize an organizational body to deal with lessons
learned. During the wars in the former Yugoslavia, the army command
provisionally organized a lessons-learned function to provide incoming
commanders and units with updated information. But this organization
had no standard operating procedures and no formal role in the training
processes or planning procedures before the missions. This involvement
changed after a 2007 review that identified the provisional nature of
lessons learned as a problem.
In 2010 the armed forces institutionalized the lessons-learned
function as a section at the headquarters that became a node in the
planning process.22 In addition to requesting other reports from
Afghanistan, the lessons-learned section ordered highly structured,
reports from the units in Mazār-e Sharīf. These reports were then
reworked and disseminated widely within the armed forces (rather than
only to the incoming commander). Consequently, the lessons-learned
section initiated and maintained a continuous tactical discussion

19. Magnus Johnsson, “MOTs, Juliette and Omelettes: Temporary, Tactical Adaptations as
the Postmodern, Inoperable Force Awaits the Anticipated Operation?,” in The Swedish Presence in
Afghanistan: Security and Defence Transformation, ed. Arita Holmberg and Jan Hallenberg (London:
Routledge, 2017), 90–91.
20. Olof Kronvall and Magnus Petersson, Svensk säkerhetspolitik i supermakternas skugga 1945–1991
(Stockholm: Santérus, 2005); and Håkan Edström and Dennis Gyllensporre, Svensk försvarsdoktrin efter
kalla kriget: Förlorade decennier eller vunna insikter? (Stockholm: Santérus, 2014).
21. Robert Egnell, Petter Hojem, and Hannes Berts, Gender, Military Effectiveness, and Organizational
Change: The Swedish Model (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014).
22. Jan Frelin and Ann Ödlund, Ett lärande försvar? Förutsättningar för Försvarsmaktens
erfarenhetshantering, FOI-R--3420--SE (Stockholm: Försvarsanalys, Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut,
2012); and Försvarsmakten, Erfarenheter Afghanistan (Stockholm: Försvarsmakten, 2016).
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throughout the armed forces. The section was also given an uncommonly
open mandate to improve its own procedures.
Noteworthy, however, the mandate of the lessons-learned section
was restricted to tactical improvements for international missions.
Consequently, this stovepiping ensured tactical, technical, and conceptual
lessons learned from Afghanistan would not enter the national domain
and be treated as general lessons learned at the land warfare school in
Skövde in southern Sweden, which develops the army’s defensive tactics.
Then Swedish Army Chief of Staff Major General Anders Brännström
stated it would be a problem if lessons from Afghanistan were allowed
to dominate army tactics in the years to come: “Battle experience
from Afghanistan is not valid elsewhere.”23 He concluded, “It is not
the same kind of combat needed to solve the main task: the defense of
the nation.”24
While the chief of staff may have had a point regarding specific
tactics—in a war for national survival, Sweden would most likely not
possess air superiority—this was not the first time Swedish tactics in
international conflicts were ignored on the home front. Since veterans
of the Congo crisis in the early 1960s were confronted with the same
arguments upon returning to their regiments, something other than
pure military rationalism seems to be at work here.
Fourth, the armed forces learned relatively quickly that they needed
to become internationalized in a way the Cold War neutrality policy
never had allowed. Over the course of the Afghanistan War, the number
of Swedish officers embedded in international staffs and headquarters
increased substantially. In 2001 there were only five Swedish officers in
NATO staffs and headquarters. This presence quickly increased and
peaked in 2011, reaching nearly 90 Swedish officers in NATO.25 As the
Afghanistan War unwound, this number quickly decreased to less than
30 officers in 2015.
Under the logic of contribution warfare, embedding officers can
be expected. Sweden did not have input into the political aims of the
intervention, which were determined by the United States. Therefore, it
is to be expected Sweden would embed as many officers as possible at
lower levels of war in order to be efficient and influential as a coalition
partner. But the decreasing number of embedded officers as the war
ended suggests Sweden understood the need for internationalization as
strictly connected to the conflict.
Oddly, these lessons seem to be understood as case-specific, despite
Sweden officially declaring it cannot defend itself alone. Since 2009, the
government has maintained solidarity: “Sweden will not remain passive
if another EU Member State or Nordic country suffers a disaster or an
23. Quoted in Roosberg and Weibull, Försvarsmakten efter ISAF, 76.
24. Quoted in Roosberg and Weibull, Försvarsmakten efter ISAF, 75.
25. Jan Ångström and Erik Noreen, “Swedish Strategy and the Afghan Experience: From
Neutrality to Ambiguity,” in The Swedish Presence in Afghanistan: Security and Defence Transformation, ed.
Arita Holmberg and Jan Hallenberg (London: Routledge, 2017), 44.
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attack. We expect these countries to act in the same way if Sweden is
affected. We must therefore be able both to give and receive support,
civilian as well as military.”26
Fifth, the government, after much deliberation, instituted a
Veterans Day in 2010 and a veterans policy in 2015.27 This lesson was
slow in coming considering Sweden has been providing forces to UN
missions, occasionally violent ones, since 1956. Arguably, the veterans
issue was delayed due to entanglement with vested bureaucratic interests.
Specifically, the armed forces and the government struggled with
whether or not officers were the only veterans or if soldiers ought to be
included too.
Despite the definitional problems, perhaps the greatest challenge
to the idea of veterans was its inherent logic. Being a veteran implies an
individual has experienced war, at great personal cost. This concept was
incompatible with the idea of Sweden being at peace for 200 years. This
state of mind also fed the logic of contribution warfare. Since the war
in Afghanistan was not motivated by Swedish political interests and the
military effort was not directed by Sweden’s political aims, it became
difficult to embrace the idea that those who served in Afghanistan
were veterans.
Finally, as Magnus Johnsson has demonstrated, three Swedish
colonels took individual initiatives to institutionalize tactical lessons
very informally between the component commanders. The Troika, as
it became known, was in charge of the previous, present, and future
Swedish force in Afghanistan. The group conceived the transition from
mentoring and stability operations to counterinsurgency operations as
a direct response to the increasingly hostile environment in northern
Afghanistan in early 2009.28 Hence, through the informal structure
of the Troika, the commanders continuously updated one another,
utilizing the individuals’ experiences, which were also case-specific
and tactical.

Lessons Identified and Not Learned

As we have seen, under the logic of contribution warfare, lessons
learned from the Afghanistan War are necessarily case-specific, not
relevant for the defense of Sweden, and consequently stovepiped.
Tactical lessons identified but not learned also confirm institutionalized
processes to apply lessons learned have a clear, but limited capability to
influence army tactics in general. By examining the nature of the lessons

26. Margot Wallström, “Statement of Government Policy,” Government of Sweden, February
13, 2019, 5.
27. Ralph Sundberg, “A Veteran at Last: The Afghan Experience and Swedish Veterans Policy,”
in The Swedish Presence in Afghanistan: Security and Defence Transformation, ed. Arita Holmberg and Jan
Hallenberg (London: Routledge, 2017), 160–81.
28. Magnus Johnsson, “Strategic Colonels: The Discretion of Swedish Force Commanders
in Afghanistan 2006–2013” (PhD diss., Department of Government, Uppsala University, 2017),
211–19.
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identified but not learned, we can see whether these can be accounted for
by the particularities of contribution warfare.
At the strategic level, the ambivalence to learning from the
Afghanistan War becomes quite clear. In particular, two biases
derived from contribution warfare led Swedish strategic elites to learn
effectively only the comfortable lessons, while merely identifying
others: understanding of the problem scopes the learning as well as
the legitimacy and appeal of solutions. First, learning occurs within the
boundaries set by what is understood as the problem. This condition
clearly aligns with contribution warfare acting as a screen through which
world events are filtered.
In the Swedish case, tactical issues are understood as problems
that can be solved. Strategic issues, however, are not understood to be
major problems since strategy, the pursuit of political ends with military
means, was never allowed to dictate the military effort. Moreover, the
vague political aim of appearing to be a good ally does not provide clear
political direction for the employment of military force.
A series of studies convey Sweden understands itself as an apolitical
actor in international interventions.29 When there is no political end
other than participation—or too many, and sometimes even conflicting,
political ends—devising a strategy becomes highly problematic.30 In
practice, strategy exists. But in the case of Afghanistan, the government
and generals at the armed forces headquarters effectively withdrew from
the process and left the conduct of the war to the colonels.31 It was, in
short, a decision made by a colonel whether or not “support the Afghan
National Army (ANA)” ought to be translated into sitting at the camp
waiting for the ANA to call for help or going out to do ANA’s work
for them.32
Hence, force was not directed toward a political aim, but toward
participation. Despite the fact that the government’s own major review
of Afghanistan identified the lack of political aim as a problem—hence,
the lesson is identified—Swedish forces in the later Mali operation had
no concrete political goals to relate to other than simply repeating the
UN mandate.33 Again, consistent with contribution warfare, to deploy
forces is more important than to employ force.

29. Ångström and Honig, “Regaining Strategy.”
30. Wikman, “Don’t Mention”; and Ångström and Noreen, “Swedish Strategy,” 31–54.
31. Jan Willem Honig and Ilmari Käihkö, “Challenges of Command: The Rise of the ‘Strategic
Colonel’,” in Leadership in Challenging Situations, ed. Harald Haas, Franz Kernic, and Andrea Plaschke
(Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2012), 89–108; Jan Willem Honig and Ilmari Käihkö, “The
Likely Lads: The Joint Swedish-Finnish PRT in Mazar-e Sharif,” in From Venus to Mars? Provincial
Reconstruction Teams and the European Military Experience in Afghanistan, 2001–2014, ed. Bernhard Chiari
et al. (Freiburg: Rombach Verlag KG, 2014), 209–20; and Johnsson, “Strategic Colonels.”
32. Johnsson, “Strategic Colonels.”
33. Tone Tingsgård, Sverige i Afghanistan 2002–2014: Betänkande av Afghanistanutredningen,
Statens Offentliga Utredningar (SOU) 2017:16 (Stockholm: Wolters Kluwers, 2017); and Svenskt
deltagande i Förenta nationernas stabiliseringsinsats i Mali, Regeringens proposition
2018/19:69, 14–16.
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Since clear political aims were not involved and political guidance
from the capital was absent, save the direction to participate, there were
no strategic lessons to be learned: the Afghanistan War was never a
political problem for small coalition partners. Ignoring strategy, however,
has several negative consequences. Avoiding to think of the intervention
as inherently strategic, that is, denying the action ought to result in a
desired end state, creates a situation in which the effects on Afghan
society are irrelevant. Thus, the important ends are to participate and to
bring Swedish forces home, preferably unscathed.
Also, leaving strategy to be shaped by midlevel military officers
implies a potential democratic deficit.34 It slowly dissolves the coherence
of the strategic narrative of the military intervention. In these cases,
if the government cannot clearly communicate why soldiers are put
in harm’s way far from Sweden, it gradually undermines support for
the intervention. In Sweden, for example, the support for international
military interventions among the general population dropped from
nearly 80 percent in the mid-1990s to just over 50 percent by the end of
the war in Afghanistan.35
The absence of politics directing the use of force also means there
is hardly any reason for strong rivalries among the political parties in
parliament.36 Consensus implies there is no danger of losing future
political debates. Hence, rather than becoming politically active on the
subject of Swedish participation in coalition wars, Swedish strategic
elites learned to be inactive. Donald Rumsfeld learned from the initial
stages of the Afghanistan War that toppling a government only required
high-altitude, precision-guided bombing in combination with Special
Forces. This rationale was then used as an argument for troop-size
reductions in Iraq War planning. Meanwhile, in Sweden, elites learned
to avoid political ends.
Second, contribution warfare narrows what actors understand as
legitimate solutions to problems and, by implication, suggests which
solutions ought to be pursued. In the case of Sweden in Afghanistan,
this situation meant there was no reason for self-criticism to improve
strategic decision making. The government review did suggest a special
decision-making body be installed within the government to coordinate
strategy and avoid suboptimal outcomes such as stovepiping development
aid and the military effort in Afghanistan.37
Such a national strategic council would be a completely new thing
in Sweden. Yet since the proposal in 2017, there have been no attempts
to create one. Again, the absence of political aims directing the use of
force in contribution warfare can explain the lack of industry in trying
34. Johnsson, “Strategic Colonels,” 245–46.
35. Erik Noreen and Jan Ångström, “A Catch-All Strategic Narrative: Target Audiences and
Swedish Troop Contributions to ISAF in Afghanistan,” in Strategic Narratives, Public Opinion, and
War: Winning Domestic Support for the Afghan War, ed. Beatrice de Graaf, George Dimitriu, and Jens
Ringsmose (London: Routledge, 2015), 295.
36. Wikman, “Don’t Mention.”
37. Tingsgård, Sverige i Afghanistan, 201–4.

72

Parameters 50(4) Winter 2020–21

to improve strategic decision making. Since strategic elites did not direct
warfare in Afghanistan, they did not have any incentives to create rival
decision-making bodies either.

Conclusion

Most case-specific, tactical lessons from Sweden’s intervention
in Afghanistan were quickly identified and learned, but general and
strategic lessons were equally quickly ignored. Within the context of
contribution warfare, this inconsistency can be best explained by Swedish
strategic elites being uneasy and inexperienced with the demands of
coalition warfare.
Sweden’s armed forces have been quite successful in learning tactical
lessons. But these lessons have been curtailed and limited to operations
in Afghanistan. Congruent with the logic of contribution warfare,
tactical lessons have not been transmitted to the national domain to
influence doctrine and tactics for the defense of Sweden. Meanwhile,
strategic lessons were identified, but never learned—for example, even
though the official governmental reviews after Afghanistan concluded
Swedish international interventions should have political ends that
effectively direct the use of force, the ongoing mission in Mali still lacks
one. But the aims set out in the UN Security Council Resolution have
been repeated.
It is important to recognize the logic of contribution warfare is not
limited to lessons-learned processes. It also influences the planning
for and conduct of wars. It is not limited to non-NATO members
partaking in NATO-led operations, although problems for small, nonNATO members such as Sweden may be accentuated in comparison
with Norway or Denmark. It should also be pointed out the structural
condition of asymmetric coalitions is probably not the only reason for
the emergence of contribution warfare.
The idea feeds into, and appears rational for, increasingly bureaucratic
military organizations as well as political leaders who are more worried
about appearances than results. Since only the United States has the
capability to launch major military interventions in the foreseeable
future, contribution warfare is likely here to stay.

